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I. INTRODUCTION
“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
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and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony of living, not political faiths;
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.”1
Marriage is a legal union that confers social acceptance, a union
historically denied to same-sex couples.2 On August 4, 2010, the Northern
District of California became the first federal court to hold sexual
orientation a suspect class and to strike down a state constitutional
amendment that prevented same-sex couples from marrying in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger.3 An appeal in the case is currently pending in the Ninth
Circuit and the parties will likely appeal to the Supreme Court.4 This Note
argues that the Court should uphold the district court’s finding that sexual
orientation is a suspect class subject to heightened scrutiny and that
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND
Over the last fifty years, gays and lesbians have struggled for equality.
Gradually, courts have invalidated laws prohibiting “homosexual” behavior
and legislatures have enacted laws aimed at banning discrimination against
gays and lesbians.5 Despite this progress towards equal rights, states still
deny marriage to same-sex couples. Historically, only a man and a woman
could enter into marriage and, today, only five states and the District of
Columbia allow same-sex marriage.6 To date, Massachusetts is the only
state in which courts have held that a same-sex marriage ban is
unconstitutional.7

1. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (invalidating a state law
criminalizing the use of contraceptives because it infringed upon the right to privacy).
2. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 445 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003).
3. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal
docketed, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (holding the amendment
unconstitutional).
4. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
5. See William N. Eskridge, The Supreme Court of California 2007-2008:
Foreword: The Marriage Cases―Reversing the Burden of Inertia in a Pluralist
Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1785, 1805 (2009) (describing the gay
rights movement’s shift from focusing on outlawed behavior to tolerance to equality).
6. See id. at 1839-40 (arguing that a Court decision on same-sex marriage could
cause backlash from non-supporters); see also CONN. GEN. STAT § 46b-20 (West
2010); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining marriage as a legal union
between two persons); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 407-09, 451 (indicating that
the California Constitution referred to a “wife” as early as 1849 and that early
California Supreme Court decisions limited marriage to a relationship between a man
and a woman) (citing Mott v. Mott, 22 P. 1140 (Cal. 1890)) .
7. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
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A. The Legislative Background of Same-Sex Marriage in California
In 1999, California created a statewide domestic registry for same-sex
couples and, over the next seven years, the State gradually expanded the
scope of rights that it granted to domestic partners until those rights
matched the ones granted to married couples.8 While purporting to provide
equal rights to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, the law only
permits marriage between a man and a woman and denies same-sex
couples the legal designation of “marriage.”9 In May of 2008, the
California Supreme Court found a provision limiting marriage to oppositesex couples unconstitutional and required the language “between a man and
a woman” to be stricken from the statute.10 California voters sought to
reinstate the limitations on marriage by adopting Proposition 8, which
amended the California Constitution to define marriage as a union between
a man and a woman.11 On November 5, 2008, the state of California
stripped gays and lesbians of their right to marriage by adopting
Proposition 8.12
B. Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Fight to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage
in California
In May of 2009, California refused to issue marriage licenses to two
same-sex couples due to the Proposition 8 amendment, which effectively
banned same-sex marriage.13 Both couples subsequently brought suit in the
Northern District of California, arguing that Proposition 8 denied them the
fundamental right of marriage and violated both the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Proposition 8 could
not withstand strict scrutiny because it failed the court’s more deferential
8. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-297.5 (Deering 2010) (defining a domestic
partnership under California law and granting domestic partners the same rights and
responsibilities as married couples); see also Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country
Club, 115 P.3d 1212, 1219 (Cal. 2005) (finding both the language of the act and
legislative intent show a clear attempt to create equal status for registered domestic
partners and married couples).
9. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2010) (limiting marriage to a union
between a man and a woman).
10. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453.
11. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010) (repealed 2008) (amending
the statute to state that “[o]nly a marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California”), with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amending the California
Constitution to state the same).
12. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
13. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927-28 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
appeal docketed, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (summarizing an unsuccessful
state court challenge that argued that Proposition 8 improperly amended the California
Constitution).
14. Id. at 927.
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rational basis review.15 The court found no rational relation to a legitimate
state interest among those interests proffered by Proposition 8 proponents.16
Thus, the court invalidated Proposition 8 under both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
measure “both unconstitutionally burdens the exercise of the fundamental
right to marry and creates an irrational classification on the basis of sexual
orientation.”17
III. ANALYSIS
In 2008, the California Supreme Court awarded a groundbreaking
victory to gays and lesbians. In its ruling in In re Marriage Cases, the
court invalidated a state statute barring same-sex marriage and held both
that sexual orientation is a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny
and that the fundamental right to marry applies to same-sex couples.18 The
Northern District of California was the first federal court to adopt these key
holdings from the Marriage Cases decision.19
A. The Fundamental Right to Marriage Applies to Same-Sex Couples
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
fundamental rights and liberties against government intrusion.20 A right is
fundamental if it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
and if liberty and justice would be impeded by the right’s abrogation.21
When a right is fundamental, the government must narrowly tailor any
attempt to infringe upon that right to serve a compelling state interest.22
The fundamental right to marriage is entrenched in our nation’s history.
Over sixty years ago, the California Supreme Court declared marriage a
basic civil right in Perez v. Sharp, a landmark decision that invalidated an
15. See id. at 997 (arguing that a statute that does not pass rational basis review
cannot survive strict scrutiny).
16. See id. at 998 (including among purported interests the promotion of oppositesex parenting and the protection of the First Amendment freedoms of those who oppose
same-sex marriage).
17. See id. at 991, 1003 (enjoining the enforcement or application of Proposition
8).
18. See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
19. See generally Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 991-1002.
20. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)) (noting that because fundamental rights are
largely out of legislative reach, the Court must exercise caution in recognizing an
asserted right as fundamental).
21. See id. at 721 (describing U.S. history and tradition as “guideposts” for
deciding whether a right is fundamental).
22. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(indicating that courts only invalidate legislation if it has no rational basis or, in the
case of certain fundamental rights, it fails to meet heightened scrutiny).
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anti-miscegenation law under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 Federal courts followed suit, culminating in the United
States Supreme Court’s adoption of the Perez holding almost twenty years
later in Loving v. Virginia.24
Forging a similar path, the federal district court in Perry properly
adopted the California Supreme Court’s view that the right to same-sex
marriage is inherent in the fundamental right to marriage.25 In cases
invalidating anti-miscegenation statutes, courts characterized the
constitutional right in question as the right to marriage rather than the right
to interracial marriage.26 Likewise, the right that same-sex couples seek to
exercise is the fundamental right to marriage, not the right to same-sex
marriage.27 The restrictions on marriage at issue in Loving and Perry both
make distinctions on the basis of status; however, just as race is irrelevant
to marriage, so is sexual orientation.28 The same-sex couples here seek the
same rights, obligations, and social status as opposite-sex couples and do
not wish to modify the “existing institution of marriage.”29
When Loving reached the Supreme Court, American society was divided
regarding interracial marriage, just as it is in regard to same-sex marriage
today.30
Nonetheless, the Court made a controversial change to
constitutional law and gradually reaffirmed its holding in Loving by
upholding the right to marriage for other groups.31 Despite the controversy
over same-sex marriage that exists today, the Court should hold that the
23. See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948) (defining marriage as “the right
to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice”).
24. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the State cannot
restrict an individual’s right to marry a person of another race).
25. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-93 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
appeal docketed, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 16 2010) (finding same-sex relationships
consistent with the history and tradition of marriage).
26. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-11; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 420 (Cal.
2008) (citing Perez, 198 P.2d at 17) (indicating that this freedom is a fundamental
right).
27. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
28. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (APA), REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON
APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 63 (Aug. 2009),
available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf (defining
same-sex orientation as a normal variant of sexuality rather than a mental or
developmental disorder and reporting attempts to change it as unsuccessful and
harmful).
29. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 421 (noting that the federal right to
marriage is well-established in both state and federal courts).
30. Compare Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 n.5 (indicating that, while fifteen states still
outlawed interracial marriage, fourteen others had repealed similar laws over the
previous fifteen years), with Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1812-14 (noting that by 2008,
only Massachusetts and five foreign countries recognized same-sex marriage).
31. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding the right to
marriage for prisoners).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

5

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 23
CROYLE 11/16/10

430

3/25/2011 7:21:43 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:1

fundamental right to marriage applies to gays and lesbians and should
reaffirm the protection of that fundamental right from government
intrusion.
B. Sexual Orientation is a Suspect Class Subject to Heightened Scrutiny
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a
heightened level of scrutiny applies to sexual orientation discrimination. In
Romer v. Evans, the Court invalidated legislation that discriminated against
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.32 The Court found it unnecessary to
determine the level of scrutiny that should apply to sexual orientation
because the legislation at issue failed even rational basis review.33
Of the federal appellate courts addressing the issue, only the Ninth
Circuit has held that strict scrutiny should apply to sexual orientation.34 In
Watkins v. U.S. Army, the Ninth Circuit found that same-sex oriented
individuals suffered a history of discrimination and political powerlessness,
and found that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic.35
However, a year later, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Watkins and returned
to rational basis review for discrimination based on sexual orientation.36 In
light of these decisions, the appropriate level of scrutiny for sexual
orientation remains unclear.
In evaluating whether a classification is suspect and, therefore, subject to
heightened scrutiny, the Court considers three factors. First, the Court
considers the history of discrimination against the group in question.37
Second, the Court evaluates the group’s ability to protect itself through the
political process.38 Finally, the Court considers whether the class is defined
by immutable characteristics, like race.39
32. See 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding no rational basis for legislation that
imposed a “broad and undifferentiated disability” on same-sex oriented individuals and
seemed motivated only by animus toward those individuals).
33. Compare id. at 632 (“Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional
inquiry”), with Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997-98 (N.D. Cal.
2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (finding strict scrutiny
unnecessary because “Proposition 8 fails to survive even rational basis review”).
34. But see, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); Nat’l
Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that
sexual orientation does not warrant review under the strict scrutiny standard).
35. 875 F.2d 699, 724-28 (9th Cir. 1989).
36. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that gays and lesbians are not a suspect class because sexual
orientation is not an immutable characteristic and because gays and lesbians are not
politically powerless) (emphasis added).
37. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (citation omitted)
(holding that age is not a suspect classification because there was no history of
purposeful discrimination against the elderly).
38. Id.
39. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
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Based on these criteria, the Court should recognize sexual orientation as
a suspect class. The history of discrimination against gays and lesbians is
well-documented and includes acts of violence, statutes forbidding samesex marriage, and job discrimination based on sexual orientation, among
other practices.40 Although recent legal reforms suggest that gays and
lesbians are not as politically powerless as they once were, the Court’s
jurisprudence makes clear that powerlessness is not a prerequisite to
qualification as a suspect class.41 Finally, the bulk of contemporary
research suggests that sexual orientation is not a choice but an immutable
characteristic influenced by a combination of genetic, hormonal, and
environmental factors.42
Recognizing sexual orientation as a suspect classification is a major
constitutional change, but it is not without precedent.43 The Court has
adopted a number of California decisions once deemed controversial,
giving California courts the reputation as both influential and cuttingedge.44 When the Court decided Romer, gays and lesbians were not
socially accepted and courts did not consider sexual orientation
immutable.45 However, increased awareness of discrimination against gays
and lesbians, recognition of the immutability of sexual orientation, and
evolving social acceptance all weigh in favor of recognizing sexual
orientation as a suspect class.

(suggesting that such characteristics are irrelevant in most government decisions).
40. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996); High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 563; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 70102; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 397 (Cal. 2008) (documenting allegations of
discrimination against same-sex oriented individuals in a variety of contexts).
41. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(defining a suspect class as subject to disabilities, intentional unequal treatment, or
political powerlessness).
42. See Barbara L. Frankowski & The American Academy of Pediatrics Committee
on Adolescence, Clinical Report: Sexual Orientation and Adolescents, 113 PEDIATRICS
1827, 1828 (2004) (noting that past characterizations of homosexuality as a mental
disorder have long since been abandoned).
43. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 768 (Cal. 1978); People v. Belous,
458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948); Mulkey v.
Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 836 (Cal. 1966) (holding controversial legislation
unconstitutional in opinions later adopted by the Supreme Court).
44. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1785-86 (suggesting that California’s reputation,
population, and economy create a “ripple effect [that extends] well beyond its
borders”).
45. See id. at 1811-15 (suggesting that society has become acclimated to and
accepting of same-sex unions and marriage).
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C. California’s Constitutional Ban on Same-Sex Marriage is Invalid Under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution
1. Proposition 8 Intrudes Upon the Fundamental Right to Marriage Under
the Due Process Clause
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the State cannot “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.”46 Marriage is a
fundamental liberty protected by this clause.47 To comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment, a government intrusion upon marriage must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.48
Proposition 8 prevents gays and lesbians from exercising their
fundamental right to marriage because it limits marriage to a union between
a man and a woman.49 The domestic partnerships provided under
California law are not marriages and differ from marriage in a number of
ways.50
Perhaps the most important difference between domestic
partnerships and marriage is the associated level of social acceptance:
society does not regard same-sex domestic partnerships as the equivalent of
marriages.51
Because the right to same-sex marriage implicates the fundamental right
of all individuals to marry and because Proposition 8 prevents gays and
lesbians from exercising that right, the Court should evaluate the
constitutionality of Proposition 8 using strict scrutiny.52
2. Proposition 8 Classifies on the Basis of Sexual Orientation Under the
Equal Protection Clause
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state cannot deny an individual
equal protection of its laws.53 The Court has repeatedly used equal
protection jurisprudence to invalidate legislation that discriminates against
a protected class.54 The Court evaluates the validity of legislation that
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that abridging the right

to marriage on the grounds of racial classification violates the Due Process Clause).
48. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702, 721 (1997) (describing the
strict scrutiny analysis as a complex balancing of competing interests).
49. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (limiting same-sex marriage by excluding gays
and lesbians from the definition of marriage).
50. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (Deering 2010) (requiring registry and a common
residence to qualify for a domestic partnership).
51. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 445 (Cal. 2008).
52. See infra Part III.A (arguing that same-sex couples seek the same rights and
obligations as opposite-sex couples).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (reaffirming the Court’s

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss1/23

8

Croyle: Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Proposition 8, and the Fight for Same-Se
CROYLE 11/16/10

2010]

3/25/2011 7:21:43 PM

THE FIGHT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

433

targets a suspect class of people, such as gays and lesbians, using strict
scrutiny.55
In Loving, the Court held that the Virginia statute prohibiting interracial
marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause because it rested solely on
racial classifications.56 Similarly, Proposition 8 categorically excludes gays
and lesbians from marriage based solely on their sexual orientation.57
Moreover, Proposition 8 treats gays and lesbians less favorably than
heterosexuals by denying them the social benefits of the legal designation
of marriage.58
Proposition 8 distinguishes between individuals who may and may not
exercise their right to marriage based on their sexual orientation.59 Because
the court in Perry recognized sexual orientation as a suspect class,60
Proposition 8 should be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.
3. No Compelling Government Interest Exists for Proposition 8
Proposition 8 interferes with the fundamental right to marriage and
classifies individuals on the basis of sexual orientation, which is a suspect
class.61 Therefore, Proposition 8 must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.62 Strict scrutiny requires both an important
reason for a law and proof that the law’s ends cannot be achieved through
less restrictive means.63
None of the potential government interests advanced by proponents of

use of the equal protection clause when it struck down segregation in public schools).
55. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(introducing the strict scrutiny standard).
56. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding that the decision to
marry someone of another race lies with the individual, not the state).
57. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (stating that California will only recognize the
marriages of heterosexual couples).
58. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008) (indicating that
exclusion from marriage harms both same-sex couples and their children).
59. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
appeal docketed, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug 16, 2010) (noting that the State granted
no marriages to same-sex couples after Proposition 8 passed).
60. See id. at 997 (noting that “[t]he trial record shows that strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review to apply to legislative classifications based on sexual
orientation”).
61. See id. at 927 (stating a complaint from two same-sex couples that they were
not permitted to marry because California only recognized heterosexual marriages).
62. See id. at 997 (arguing that all classifications based on sexual orientation are
subject to strict scrutiny).
63. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (noting that
a suitable alternative at a tolerable administrative expense may be sufficient).
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Proposition 8 are legitimate, let alone compelling.64 For example,
proponents argue that the government has an interest in promoting
opposite-sex parenting over same-sex parenting; however, studies indicate
that concerns about same-sex parenting are unfounded and that children of
same-sex couples are “well-adjusted, demonstrating more competencies
and fewer behavioral problems than their peers . . . .”65 Proponents also
argue that Proposition 8 is valid for the purposes of preserving marriage as
a union between a man and a woman, protecting the freedom of those who
oppose marriage for same-sex couples, and treating same-sex couples
differently from opposite sex couples; however, Proposition 8 does not
interfere with the beliefs or the rights of those who oppose same-sex
marriage.66 The proffered interests are more properly characterized as
animus or a personal moral code, which cannot properly serve as an
impetus for legislation.67
Because no legitimate interest for Proposition 8’s ban on same-sex
marriage exists, the Court should invalidate the proposition.68 Without a
rational basis, it is impossible for the interests set forth by proponents of
Proposition 8 to qualify as the compelling interests necessary for
Proposition 8 to survive the more stringent strict scrutiny review.69 Thus,
Proposition 8 cannot pass heightened scrutiny under either the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
no compelling state interest exists to justify California’s intrusion on the
fundamental right to marriage or discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Should Perry v. Schwarzenegger reach the Supreme Court, the Court
should adopt the California Supreme Court’s holdings for two reasons.
First, the fundamental right to marriage applies to same-sex couples, who

64. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (finding many of these interests reflected
only fear or dislike of gays and lesbians).
65. See Nanette Gartrell & Henny Bos, U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family
Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17-Year-Old Adolescents, 126 PEDIATRICS 28, 34
(2010) (finding that children of same-sex couples have higher performance in academic
and social settings and fewer indicators of social problems, like rule-breaking or
aggressive behavior, than other teens).
66. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997-1001 (noting that neither parents’ rights to
educate their children nor any personal moral or religious belief is affected by
invalidating Proposition 8).
67. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (holding that the state cannot
use its power to enforce a moral code).
68. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
69. Id.
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seek no additional rights beyond those given to opposite-sex couples.70
Second, the history of discrimination against gays and lesbians and the
immutable nature of their sexual orientation warrant their designation as a
suspect class.71 Infringement of a fundamental right and class-based
legislation trigger strict scrutiny review and provide the grounds on which
the Supreme Court should affirm Perry because Proposition 8 is not
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.

70. See id. at 992-93 (equating same-sex marriage with any other marriage).
71. See id. at 964 (finding sexual orientation a fundamental characteristic of an

individual’s identity).
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